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Executive Summary
Technology transfer to developing countries is crucial to their economic growth and competitiveness in 
world markets. There are also environmental benefits to technology transfer. Climate-change-related tech-
nologies assist countries, firms, and individuals in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and coping with the 
adverse consequences of climate change. Their transfer to developing countries is a crucial element of efforts 
to meet the challenges posed by climate change. However, despite numerous commitments by the interna-
tional community over the past generation, technology transfer is not happening quickly enough.
There are many reasons for this delay, one of which is global intellectual property rights (IPR) pro-
tection. IPRs are designed to foster innovation by protecting assets and rewarding innovators, but they do 
so at a cost of delayed access, reduced competition and higher prices. These problems are particularly acute 
in developing nations. Many climate-change-related technologies are unavailable in developing countries at 
reasonable prices, meaning that these technologies cannot be employed in parts of the world where they may 
be needed most. 
There is an intense empirical debate as to whether, on balance, strong IPR protection helps or 
hinders technology transfer to developing countries. Leaving this question aside, it is clear that certain 
components of the present IPR regime tilt in favor of innovator protections and profits at the expense of the 
economic and environmental benefits that flow from climate-change-related technology transfer. 
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), passed 
in 1994 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, is the primary global IPR treaty. The TRIPS Agreement 
mandates strong patent protections for nearly all inventions and effectively limits opportunities to contest 
IPR abuses. There are few clear restrictions on anti-competitive practices, and transition periods for develop-
ing countries are set to expire. With the threat of trade sanctions behind it, TRIPS poses a formidable barrier 
to diffusion of critical technologies.
On the other hand, the TRIPS Agreement contains several principles and provisions that are po-
tential motivators of climate-change-related technology transfer. The Agreement explicitly promotes envi-
ronmental, public health, and development goals and gives Members some discretion to determine when 
those goals should override the normal TRIPS restrictions. These flexibilities have already been employed to 
promote affordable essential medicine availability in the developing world.
There are three ways to remedy the problems that TRIPS creates for climate-change-related technol-
ogy transfer. First, the TRIPS flexibilities just mentioned must be exploited in favor of technology transfer. 
The Agreement must be viewed as a unified document, guided by concerns of public health and economic 
development. Developed-country obligations to promote technology transfer must be enforced. And the 
public health exemptions granted during the Doha Round of WTO negotiations must be construed broadly 
so as to include some technologies that guard against climate change.
The second approach is to modify the TRIPS Agreement in order to propel technology transfer. 
Developing countries could be given increased discretion in adapting IPR laws to their economic, social and 
environmental needs. Climate-friendly technologies could receive special treatments like those afforded to 
essential medicines. And pro-competition provisions in TRIPS could be strengthened.iv
Finally, institutions unrelated to TRIPS could take the lead in encouraging technology transfer. An 
agreement on information access and benefit sharing could curtail excessive patenting and improve prospects 
for innovation in both developed and developing countries. A world competition agreement could limit 
abusive IPR practices and lower prices for developing country consumers. Individual government or inter-
governmental funding sources could provide financial incentives for both technological innovation and its 
diffusion. Technology needs assessments conducted in developing countries could be matched with specific 
R&D projects. Each of these mechanisms could be set up so as to favour the climate-change-related technol-
ogy sector.
Concurrent policies will also be needed to ensure that climate-change-related technologies are not 
only available to developing countries, but also that they are used effectively to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions, to adapt to the negative effects of climate change, and to stimulate domestic innovation. Bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements should protect the existing TRIPS flexibilities and avoid unduly burdensome 
“TRIPS-plus” provisions. Investment in education, training, and management in both developed and devel-
oping countries should increase the capacities of developing countries to employ technologies effectively.
Attempts to rebalance the global IPR regime face many of the same political challenges that have 
doomed past efforts. However, there is heightened awareness of the dangers climate change poses and an 
accompanying sense of urgency among politicians, as well as scientists, to address the problem. Climate-
change-related technologies can be viewed as public goods that are essential for developing countries to fend 
off a climate crisis precipitated principally by their industrialized neighbours. Now is the time to call for firm 
commitments to minimize barriers to climate-change-related technology transfer, including barriers posed by 
unduly stringent IPR protection. Developed and developing nations share the obligation to find solutions to 
this problem, both within and outside the context of the TRIPS Agreement. 1
The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related  
Technologies to Developing Countries
Matthew Littleton1
Introduction
Modification of the global intellectual property regime is vital to climate change mitigation and adaptation 
efforts in developing countries. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have significant effects on economic devel-
opment and the environment, largely through their impact on the availability and deployment of technolo-
gies in the developing world. Many of these are climate-change-related technologies that limit greenhouse 
gas emissions by reducing pollution, increasing efficiency of production and energy usage, or facilitating the 
capture and storage of carbon. These technologies are sorely needed to support sustainable development. 
Yet, most climate-change-related technologies are concentrated in industrialized countries, and technology 
transfer to the developing world is not happening fast enough (World Bank, 2008).
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, or “the 
Agreement”) is the most significant global IPR treaty (WTO, 1994d).2 While there are other forums in 
which to pursue IPR reform, the TRIPS Agreement has become the focal point for debate on intellectual 
property’s impact on economic development, technology transfer, and public health. Despite significant 
attention, the impact of policy discussions within and outside the WTO has been minimal in the case of 
climate-friendly technology transfer.
This paper surveys the relationship between IPRs and technology transfer, examines the relevant pro-
visions of TRIPS, and discusses prospects for motivating climate-change related technology transfer through 
exploitation, modification, or circumvention of the Agreement. Part II defines relevant terminology, lists the 
benefits from and barriers to climate-friendly technology transfer, and summarizes past commitments and 
failed efforts for IPR reform. Part III consists of a detailed examination of the TRIPS principles and provi-
sions relevant to technology transfer. Part IV discusses the flexibilities inherent in TRIPS, potential modifi-
cations of the Agreement, and alternative regimes, both pre-existing and hypothetical, which could be used 
to promote technology transfer in concert with, or in spite of, TRIPS. Finally, Part V discusses concurrent 
economic policies necessary to ensure sufficient climate-friendly technology transfer.
The conclusion of this paper is that climate-change-related technology transfer is insufficiently stim-
ulated under the current IPR regime. Industrialized and developing countries share responsibility for over-
hauling TRIPS and domestic IPR laws to address climate change, following in the footsteps of recent public 
health exceptions to IPR regulations. Achievement of this goal will require simultaneous actions within and 
outside the WTO. Firm, measurable, and verifiable commitments are needed to ensure that environmental-
ly-friendly technology transfer to developing countries moves past rhetoric and into reality.
1  This paper was written during an internship with the Policy Integration and Analysis Branch of the Division for 
Sustainable Development, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Extensive and thoughtful comments were 
provided by David O’Connor and Chantal Line Carpentier.
2  Several other multilateral, regional and bilateral intellectual property and free trade agreements exist but will not be 
addressed here.2  DESA Working Paper No. 71
Background
This Part provides working definitions for the terms “technology transfer” and “environmentally sound tech-
nology,” outlines the economic and environmental benefits of technology transfer, and discusses potential 
barriers to technology transfer. It then summarizes the various commitments and actions promoting technol-
ogy transfer already agreed to by intergovernmental bodies and parties to several international environmental 
agreements. Two failed attempts at IPR reform favouring technology transfer are also reviewed.
Definitions
Technology Transfer
Technology transfer is problematic to define, since it can happen in many different ways. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, this paper will adopt the definition of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC):
the broad set of processes covering the flows of knowledge, experience and equipment amongst 
different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs 
and research/educational institutions (IPCC, 2000).
Technology transfer occurs predominantly in the private marketplace and takes a number of forms. 
Intra-firm transfers take place between headquarters and subsidiaries of a trans-national corporation, ei-
ther through direct product or process transfer, training, or information sharing. Inter-firm transfers occur 
through joint ventures between foreign and domestic companies, sales or management contracts that transfer 
products and personnel, or licensing agreements. Foreign direct investment is a prime source of technology 
transfer.3 Finally, unsanctioned technology transfers take place through imitation, which may take the form 
of simple product inspection, trial-and-error, or complex reverse engineering.
Climate-Change-Related Technologies
A key issue in defining the set of technologies that combat climate change is whether technologies relating to 
adaptation should be treated on an equal footing with those relating to mitigation. If so, the range of technol-
ogies becomes very broad and includes any technology that helps individuals or firms deal with the negative 
results of climate change. This paper will deal mainly with mitigation technologies but highlight areas where 
adaptation technology transfer could also be encouraged.
Climate-change-related technologies are a subset of so-called “environmentally sound technologies” 
(ESTs). For present purposes, the two terms will be used interchangeably. Environmentally sound technolo-
gies are defined primarily by their functions:
Environmentally sound technologies protect the environment, are less polluting, use all resources 
in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes and products, and handle residual 
wastes in a more acceptable manner than the technologies for which they were substitutes…. En-
vironmentally sound technologies in the context of pollution are ‘process and product technolo-
gies’ that generate low or no waste, for the prevention of pollution. They also cover ‘end of the 
pipe’ technologies for treatment of pollution after it has been generated (United Nations, 1992b).
3  This investment might take the form of “turn-key” packages, where the transnational corporation supplies equipment, 
infrastructure, and management and production plans; or build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements, where a private 
company builds a factory, operates it until the desired return is achieved, and then turns it over to a government or 
domestic firm (Verhoosel, 1998).The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to DCs  3
Classifying technologies in this manner makes it difficult to define clear boundaries. A major prob-
lem is that this definition depends on the temporal and geographic setting. An EST in rural Chad, for ex-
ample, might not be considered as such in Belgium, and the same technology might not be environmentally 
sound anywhere ten years later.4 It is also unclear how ESTs relate to or overlap with environmental goods 
and services. Finally, some argue that traditional knowledge and technology should be placed on an equal 
footing with cutting-edge ESTs.
Benefits of Climate-Change-Related Technology Transfer
Environmentally-sound technology transfer to developing countries has both economic and environmental 
benefits. In many developing countries, domestic industry is far from the technology frontier, and adoption 
of existing technologies has a higher return than innovation. Technology transfers can also increase domestic 
industrial competitiveness and have spillover effects through learning-by-doing and learning-by-watching 
(Juma, 2005).
Transfers of climate-change-related technologies have environmental benefits as well. In addition to 
the immediate reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, these technologies represent a positive step toward sus-
tainable consumption and production in the longer term. More difficult to measure, but arguably as impor-
tant, is the impact they have on changing industry and consumer attitudes toward environmental protection. 
Finally, these transfers have the potential to promote “voluntary standardization” of cleaner process and pro-
duction methods, which could eventually facilitate stricter environmental regulations (Matsushita, 2006).5
Barriers to Technology Transfer
The barriers to EST transfer vary by the product, process, or information concerned, but they can generally 
be broken down into supply-side and demand-side barriers. On the supply side, the basic problem is that the 
vast majority of technologies are held by a handful of firms in industrialized countries. Trade and investment 
policy barriers, limited market size, high transaction costs, and fear of losing control over proprietary tech-
nologies can discourage firms in these countries from making their technologies available abroad.
On the demand side, the barriers are just as daunting. Developing country firms often have little 
to offer financially or otherwise in exchange for new technologies. In addition, low human capital,6 lack of 
physical capital, and poor credit access hamper the prospects for EST transfer. Finally, domestic laws and 
policies can deter demand for ESTs. For example, weak environmental protection standards will eliminate 
firms’ incentives to switch to more environmentally-friendly technologies.
One barrier that can affect EST transfer on both the supply and demand sides is the intellectual 
property regime. One could think of IPRs as affecting technology supply (firms may refuse to transfer with-
out asset protection) or technology demand (one of the domestic policies that can affect technology demand, 
as mentioned above). There is vigorous debate over whether IPRs, on balance, help or hinder technology 
transfer.
4  This problem is particularly acute in the climate change context, since “[t]he technology to be transferred under the 
climate change conventions is, by and large, much less specific [than that, say, under the Montreal Protocol] and is, in 
fact, virtually boundless” (Verhoosel, 1998). 
5  This de facto standardization is often followed in time by official standardization (i.e., under the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO)).
6  Lack of highly skilled workers (i.e., engineers, technicians, and managers) in high-technology sectors is particularly 
damaging.4  DESA Working Paper No. 71
The empirical evidence is mixed on this question. There is clearly variation by industry, as char-
acteristics like market dynamism, technological sophistication, importance of research and development 
(R&D), and ease of imitation come into play. The evidence suggests that increased technology transfer can 
be induced by stronger IPR protection in large economies and economies in transition (Branstetter, 2006; 
Hoekman, 2004).
On the other hand, small developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs) do not appear 
to receive such benefits (Blyde and Acea, 2003; Smith, 2001).7 This trend is likely due to reduced incen-
tives for technology transfer on the part of firms due to lesser economies of scale in small countries and poor 
governance in LDCs. Clearly, strong IPR protection is neither necessary nor sufficient for extensive foreign 
investment, as the cases of China and Brazil demonstrate. However, there could conceivably be “threshold ef-
fects,” where strong IPR protection in developing countries only promotes technology transfer under certain 
conditions (Reichman and Maskus, 2004). While not the focus of this paper, further empirical studies must 
be conducted in order to determine the IPR regime that would achieve optimal balance between IPR holder 
protection and diffusion of technology to developing countries.
Past Commitments to Encourage Technology Transfer
The role of technology transfer in development has been recognized for several decades (Menescal, 2006). 
The need for improved technology transfer and the recognition of the role IPRs play in the process have been 
clearly stated by the WTO, various UN agencies, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and sev-
eral nongovernmental organizations. However, this rhetoric has not been followed up sufficiently by concrete 
action. This section summarizes past commitments in order to emphasize that progress in this area is long 
overdue. A comprehensive list of these commitments, including relevant language, is provided in Annex A.
Early Commitments
An obligation to share technologies vital to environmental protection and, therefore, public health could be 
implied from the duty to cooperate under the UN Charter, Articles 55-56. The earliest explicit language re-
ferring to the importance of technology transfer for environmental and developmental goals occurred in the 
Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 (United Nations 1972). 
Two subsequent MEAs, the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention, also included language to encour-
age technology transfer (Montreal Protocol, 1987; Basel Convention, 1989).8
Rio Conventions
The commitment to EST transfer took on new urgency during the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in 1992. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in particular, 
emphasized the importance of technology as a route to climate change mitigation (UNFCCC, 1992). Subse-
quent developments in the UNFCCC related to technology transfer include:
endorsement of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, which requests that developed countries “take  • 
all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance” EST access and transfer to developing 
countries (UNFCCC, 1998a). In particular, the plan envisions an “enabling environment … to 
stimulate private sector investment” in EST transfer (UNFCCC, 1998b);
7  However, at least one investigator finds positive associations between strong IPR protection and economic growth for 
low-income, but not middle-income, countries (Falvey, 2006).
8  The Montreal Protocol is still thought of as a successful model for EST transfer (WTO, 2007).The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to DCs  5
creation of a technology transfer clearinghouse, termed TT:CLEAR, which inventories ESTs to  • 
improve access to knowledge and stimulate transfers;
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC  • 
which transfer energy-efficiency and renewable energy technologies;9
a possible commitment under the Bali Road Map to “measurable, reportable and verifiable”  • 
technology transfer and financing to developing countries (UNFCCC, 2007a); and
passage of numerous decisions targeted towards technology transfer. •  10 These decisions typically 
provide for country-based technology needs assessments as well as “the identification and re-
moval of barriers at each stage of the process” (UNFCCC, 2001). These include “encourag[ing] 
Parties to avoid … [IPR] policies, or lack thereof, restricting transfer of technology” (UNFCCC, 
2007b). A specialized Expert Group on Technology Transfer has been formed in order to carry 
out these functions.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 1992), while espousing consistency with strong IPR 
protection, has committed financial resources to promote technology transfer and promulgated voluntary 
guidelines for access and benefit sharing (ABS) in relation to plant varieties (CBD, 2002). Like the UN-
FCCC, the CBD has passed decisions emphasizing the creation of “enabling environments,” improvement in 
information systems, and completion of needs-based technology assessments (CBD, 2004).
Building on the CBD work, the International Seed Treaty has established a “Multilateral System” 
(MLS) of free ABS of certain plant genetic resources (FAO, 2001). Under the MLS terms, new materials 
developed with the resources must be shared or a share of the profits contributed to a fund used to promote 
conservation and sustainable use of the resources in developing countries. While many key genetic resources 
are excluded, the MLS could serve as a prototype for an ABS treaty for climate-change-related technologies, 
as discussed in Part IV (Barton and Maskus, 2006).
World Intellectual Property Organization
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a UN agency, sets international norms for IPR rights. 
While it has traditionally focused on strengthening IPRs, WIPO also has responsibility for “facilitating the 
transfer of technology related to industrial property to the developing countries” (United Nations, 1974).
Unfortunately, WIPO has struggled to carry out this mandate. Instead, attempts to harmonize IPR 
laws have resulted in coerced conformity with the strictest IPR regulations of industrialized countries. Prospects 
for a reversal of this trend have improved recently, with the initiation of the so-called “WIPO Development 
Agenda.”11 On the heels of WIPO General Assembly approval (WIPO, 2007), the Committee on Develop-
ment and Intellectual Property is currently negotiating action on a number of development-friendly proposals 
for modification of IPR law (WIPO, 2008). In addition, WIPO has begun to provide information to develop-
ing countries about their range of options for domestic IPR regimes under current international laws.12
9  However, the vast majority of these projects are concentrated in a few large developing countries; few are in LDCs.
10  In fact, decisions on “Development and transfer of technologies” have been passed at 10 of the 13 sessions of the 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties.
11  Begun in 2004, this initiative was spearheaded by the Group of Friends of Development, led by Argentina and Brazil 
(WIPO, 2004). A long list of academics, businesspeople, and other civil society members endorsed this initiative and 
pressed WIPO to “formally embrace the notions of balance, appropriateness, and the stimulation of both competitive 
and collaborative models of creative activity” (Geneva Declaration, 2004).
12  This information is provided through the WIPO Cooperation for Development Programme.6  DESA Working Paper No. 71
World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is most closely involved with IPRs and technology transfer through 
the TRIPS Agreement, which is treated extensively in Part III. However, other WTO Agreements also 
impact EST transfer. The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) regulates trade in “technology 
services” and “environmental services,” as well as labour mobility (WTO, 1994f).13 Standards promulgated 
under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO, 1994a) and the Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (WTO, 1994c) shape markets by determining which products may be transferred. 
The commitments to technology transfer in these agreements are generally “best endeavor clauses” that lack 
firm, measurable commitments by either developed or developing countries.14
The WTO has assigned responsibility for negotiations on technology transfer to subsidiary bodies. 
The Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment created the Committee on Trade and Environment to 
deal with, inter alia, issues of technology transfer (WTO, 1994g), but the group has been largely impotent. 
More recently, the Doha Ministerial Declaration prompted the creation of the Working Group on Trade and 
Technology Transfer (WGTTT) (WTO, 2001c). Despite the specificity of its mandate, the WGTTT “has 
made no progress in developing concrete and practical recommendations” (South Centre, 2005).
The 2001 Doha Declarations had a number of important references to technology transfer and, 
as will be discussed in Part IV, may represent a breakthrough in WTO negotiations on IPRs.15 The Doha 
Ministerial Declaration underscored that countries are able to take measures “acting for the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment” (WTO, 2001c). However, such measures must 
be compatible with WTO agreements, and they cannot be “arbitrary” or “disguised restrictions on interna-
tional trade” (WTO, 2001c). This statement might be read narrowly as simply reiterating that countries have 
flexibilities to take such measures under current WTO law. However, it also suggests that WTO agreements 
ought to be read with a sympathetic eye toward countries acting in the interest of environmental protection.
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health lends credence to that interpretation. It states 
that the TRIPS Agreement “can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
WTO Members’ right to protect public health” (WTO, 2001a). Finally, the Doha Implementation Declara-
tion obligates developed countries to submit “detailed reports on the functioning in practice of the incentives 
provided to their enterprises for the transfer of technology” (emphasis added) to LDCs (WTO, 2001b).16 
The texts of the Doha Declarations will be further examined later in the paper.
Failed Negotiations on Technology Transfer
In the 1970s, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) began to coordinate work on a 
Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology.17 The initial focus of negotiations was 
a rebalancing of technology licensing regulations to be more favourable to developing countries. In particu-
lar, the code “would have affirmed the right of nations to review technology transfer contracts and object to 
13  Labor mobility effects technology absorption through its effects on human capital.
14  Best endeavor clauses simply require parties to make a good faith effort to achieve the goals at issue, with no clear 
consequences if the goals are not achieved.
15  This progress could help to motivate developing countries to revive the now-floundering Doha talks.
16  This directive, echoed in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health (WTO, 2001a) was intended to help 
developed countries fulfill their obligations under TRIPS Article 66.2.
17  These negotiations were a subset of a larger project, termed the New International Economic Order, which aimed to 
realign the global balance of power to allow developing countries to compete economically with the industrial world.The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to DCs  7
restrictive clauses favouring transnational foreign companies” (Matsushita, 2006).18 After protracted negotia-
tions began to consider the wider framework of competition law, the process collapsed, leaving no affirmative 
commitments (Ullrich, 2001).
Another failed attempt to reach common ground on technology transfer was the short-lived Inter-
Sessional Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Technology Transfer and Cooperation, created by the 
first session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. The group could not overcome ideological 
differences and was quickly disbanded (Verhoosel, 1998). Like the Draft Code of Conduct, this effort was 
started in a spirit of cooperation and ended in failure. In some respects, it is hard to see what has changed 
diplomatically since the failure of these two efforts that would increase the likelihood of success for negotia-
tions today (Faundez, 2001). In any case, it is important to consider this history when discussing politically-
feasible avenues for strengthening commitments to technology transfer.
The Trips Agreement and Technology Transfer
This Part examines the principles and provisions in TRIPS that affect climate-change-related technol-
ogy transfer. It begins by looking at the Preamble to the Agreement and three TRIPS principles that merit 
consideration in interpreting the provisions of the Agreement. The discussion then moves to protection of 
patents, which are the most common type of IPR for ESTs. After a brief treatment of TRIPS protections for 
trade secrets, measures to promote competition are discussed. Next, the flexibilities allowed for developing 
countries are addressed. This Part concludes by summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of TRIPS as a 
motivator of technology transfer. Annex B provides the full texts of the TRIPS Articles discussed here.
Preamble and Principles
Principles play an important role in interpreting substantive provisions of international treaties as they apply 
to specific cases (United Nations, 1969).19 As mentioned previously, the Doha Declarations have emphasized 
the importance of the TRIPS principles. While ministerial declarations may not carry the same weight as the 
formal agreement,20 they do indicate that Members consider the guiding principles to be crucial to TRIPS 
interpretation.
The Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement contains two references to promotion of technology transfer 
to developing countries. The Members recognize:
the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual prop-
erty, including developmental and technological objectives
and
the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the 
domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and 
viable technological base (WTO, 1994d).
18  Restrictive business conditions are discussed further in Parts III and IV.
19  Both the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Member legislatures need to interpret the TRIPS Agreement.
20  The precise legal status of Declarations is unclear, and it may be different depending on declaration (Charnovitz, 2002; 
Gathii, 2002).8  DESA Working Paper No. 71
These statements, in the tradition of the commitments to technology transfer discussed in Part II, 
help to set the tone for the Agreement. The objectives of the IPR system include promoting development 
goals, and this can only be done if protected assets are transferred to developing countries. It is also impor-
tant to note that LDCs are entitled to maximum flexibility in TRIPS implementation.
After the Preamble, there are three principles that are particularly relevant for technology transfer. 
The first is stated in Article 6, which deals with exhaustion. Exhaustion is the legal term of art referring to 
the expiration of patent protection for a specific item (not the expiration of general patent rights) once that 
item has been sold by or under the authority21 of the IPR holder. Article 6 explicitly leaves the determination 
of exhaustion rules in the hands of individual Members.22
There are generally two ways that countries deal with exhaustion. Under universal exhaustion, the 
patent holder on a particular item cannot limit that item’s distribution once it has been initially sold by or 
under authority of the IPR holder. In other words, parallel or “gray market” importing is permitted, wherein 
competitors may buy products from the IPR holder and compete directly with that right holder in other 
countries. Territorial exhaustion, on the other hand, requires that a patent be sold domestically by or under 
authority of the IPR holder in order to exhaust patent rights. In this case, no parallel importing can occur 
without the patent owner’s consent. Because parallel importing cuts into IPR holders’ profits, patent owners 
generally favour territorial exhaustion. On the other side, universal exhaustion may be in the best interest of 
developing country consumers.
Depending upon the incentives different exhaustion systems create, they may aid or hinder technol-
ogy transfer to developing countries. Parallel imports increase competition, which lowers prices and makes 
technologies more accessible in developing countries. However, by the same reasoning, they limit IPR holder 
profits and may discourage innovation and thus, ultimately, technology transfer. A novel possibility, which 
has been suggested as a compromise for small developing countries, is regional exhaustion (Maskus, 2001). 
Here, parallel importing would only be allowed when the product was sold within the region at issue. By 
creating geographic buffer zones for patent protection, yet at the same time allowing for parallel importing, 
regional exhaustion might properly balance technology transfer with incentives to innovate.
Article 7, entitled “Objectives,” presents the clearest statement in TRIPS regarding the importance 
of technology transfer:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promo-
tion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations (WTO, 1994d).
This Article is treated only as a goal without specific obligations imposed. However, its importance 
as a guiding principle of the agreement was supported by both the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the 
Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health (WTO, 2001c; 2001a).
Finally, Article 8 establishes the rights of Members to protect public health and the public interest. 
The TRIPS Agreement specifically recognizes the potential for abuse of IPRs and states unambiguously that 
Members have a right to defend themselves against such abuses.
21  Licensees are considered to be under the authority of the IPR holder with respect to the protected asset. Subsidiaries 
and affiliated firms are also considered to be authorized.
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Members may … adopt [TRIPS-consistent] measures necessary to protect public health and nu-
trition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic 
and technological development.... Appropriate [TRIPS-consistent] measures … may be needed to 
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology (WTO, 
1994d).
The potential for corrective action remains constrained by the requirement that such measures be 
consistent with the provisions (rather than the principles) of TRIPS. Thus, while providing some ammu-
nition for Members who wish to oppose IPR abuses, Article 8 could be read as subordinating the TRIPS 
principles to the subsequent provisions. However, the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the Declaration on 
TRIPS & Public Health singled out Article 8 for consideration in its own right (WTO, 2001c; 2001a).
Patent Protection
The TRIPS Agreement dictates the length, breadth and exclusive rights awarded under patents, while carving 
out exceptions to IPR protection under limited circumstances. Patents are typically awarded for twenty-year 
periods, with shorter terms granted for particular categories of patents. Right holders can prevent unauthor-
ized third-party use or initial sale of the protected matter. They may also assign, transfer, or license their 
rights to other parties (WTO, 1994d).
Coverage
TRIPS provides coverage for a wide range of inventions, irrespective of where they are invented or initially 
patented. In addition, “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology” are eligible 
for patent protection (WTO, 1994d). This could make it difficult to single out ESTs for patent exceptions. 
However, certain pharmaceutical products have been exempted, as discussed previously, and the WTO Ap-
pellate Body has interpreted this non-discrimination provision leniently (Abbott, 2001),23 so this language 
may not pose a problem for countries wishing to isolate ESTs for special treatment.
Article 27 enumerates a few exceptions to this otherwise broad coverage. Most notably, Members 
may refuse to patent technologies if “necessary to protect ordre public or morality” (WTO, 1994d). Such 
exemptions may be required to “protect human, animal or plant life or health” or “to avoid serious prejudice 
to the environment” (WTO, 1994d). It is certainly possible that ESTs could be construed to fall under this 
exception, although this extension might be difficult politically. The other two exceptions relate to medical 
techniques and plants and animals.
One ambiguity in TRIPS that might limit patent coverage is that standard patentability criteria are 
not defined. Typically, such criteria include novelty of the invention, the “inventive step” requirement, and 
industrial applicability. Without uniform criteria, Members may be able to exclude some inventions from 
patentability based on particularly stringent patentability criteria (ITCSD, 2008). However, fine-tuning 
patent rules to this end would be difficult in practice, and negotiations are now underway at WIPO on a 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty that would eliminate this loophole (WIPO, 2008a).
23  Abbott cites a WTO Appellate Body Report (WTO Appellate Body, 1997) which found that the plain language of 
TRIPS, as interpreted under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (United Nations, 1969), 
indicated a right to compulsory licensing in certain cases.10  DESA Working Paper No. 71
Unauthorized Use Exceptions
Once a patent is awarded, TRIPS allows for unauthorized use by third parties (typically in the form of com-
pulsory licensing) under certain conditions. There are three categories of such exceptions. The first, stated 
in Article 30, grants exemptions “provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties” (WTO, 1994d). It is unlikely that these criteria 
would be met in the case of an EST, unless the “legitimate interests of third parties” in mitigating or adapt-
ing to climate change are given tremendous weight.
The second category of unauthorized use exceptions is the security exception. TRIPS may not “pre-
vent a Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests” or “prevent a Member from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security” (WTO, 1994d). Barring an imminent 
global climate catastrophe, it is difficult to imagine these conditions being met by EST patents.
More promising are exceptions granted on a case-by-case basis under Article 31. Several criteria 
must be met to qualify as an Article 31 exception. First, reasonable efforts must be made to gain appropriate 
authorization from the IPR holder. This negotiation requirement is waived when the Member determines 
(using its own judgment) that a “national emergency” or “other circumstances of extreme urgency” demand 
unauthorized use without delay (WTO, 1994d). The IPR holder must still be notified immediately.
Discussions on public health exceptions have echoed countries’ flexibility to determine what con-
stitute exigent circumstances, opening the door to potential use of these exceptions in the climate change 
context.24 The negotiation prerequisite may also be waived in cases where a government or its contractor 
aims to engage in “non-commercial use” of the patent (e.g., use for national defence purposes). It should be 
emphasized that a finding of exigency is only required to waive the negotiation requirement for an Article 31 
exception; compulsory licensing may still be permissible in the absence of exigent circumstances.
Sales of protected assets must occur predominantly in the domestic market for the firm granted the 
exception. This presents a number of problems for technology transfer. Exceptions must be sought by firms 
in multiple developing countries in order to diffuse technologies rapidly. In addition, economies of scale may 
foreclose domestic distribution as a viable economic activity.25
In recognition of this problem, the domestic market requirement has been temporarily waived for 
public health emergencies in countries with insufficient domestic production (WTO, 2003). The WTO has 
adopted an amendment to Article 31 that would create a permanent waiver of the domestic market restric-
tion for certain pharmaceuticals and open up the possibility of regional markets for these products (WTO, 
2005a).26 Again, this waiver could theoretically be extended to ESTs, particularly in light of the Declara-
tion on TRIPS & Public Health’s pronouncement that “[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory 
24  “Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, it being understood that public health crises … can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency” (WTO, 2001a).
25  This problem would not be applicable in the case of large developing country economies like China or Brazil, however.
26  Proposed Article 31bis and its accompanying Annex are not yet in force, since two-thirds of WTO Members have not 
ratified the amendments. It is likely that the number of ratifications will increase as the developing-country transition 
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licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted” (WTO, 2001a). 
On the other hand, such a concession would meet with strong resistance from IPR holders and several indus-
trialized countries.
The requirements for good faith negotiation and predominantly domestic production are both 
waived in cases where anti-competitive IPR abuse has been determined by a judicial or administrative body. 
This provision is discussed in Section D below.
Article 31 exceptions are limited in scope and duration to the original motivation for the exception. 
Patent licensing is non-exclusive and cannot be reassigned without the right holder’s consent. Finally, and 
crucially, the right holder must be compensated, with the amount subject to domestic judicial review. For 
many developing country firms, even a small level of compensation may doom efforts to market protected 
ESTs.
Trade Secret Protection
Protection for undisclosed information, or trade secrets, is required under Article 39. Health and safety data 
are particularly relevant for ESTs, as they often need to be submitted for government approval. However, 
governments may not circulate these data except “where necessary to protect the public” or where “steps are 
taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use” (WTO, 1994d). Even if patents 
are transferred, the absence of this data may make it practically difficult to use them, presenting a further ob-
stacle for many developing countries (Verma, 1998; Heald, 2002). This topic is explored further in Part IV.
Pro-Competition Measures
Competition laws promote consumer welfare and a healthy commercial life by restricting monopolistic and 
abusive firm behaviours. There is no global competition pact analogous to TRIPS, but the Agreement does 
contain several competition-related provisions.
As mentioned in Section A, Article 8 authorizes Members to take measures to prevent abuse of IPRs 
and promote trade and technology transfer. The scope of this provision could be interpreted in vastly differ-
ent ways. For one thing, “unreasonable” practices are in the eye of the beholder. Nor is it clear what measures 
are “appropriate.” Finally, Article 8 does not address other restrictions on technology transfer that are not 
anti-competitive. However, this Article still has the potential to motivate technology transfer in some cases, if 
developing countries are able to enforce it.27
Article 40 allows Members to designate particular licensing practices as anti-competitive and adopt 
TRIPS-consistent policies to “prevent or control” these practices (WTO, 1994d). Three practices are listed 
as examples: exclusive grant-back conditions, where rights to new inventions stemming from the patented 
asset must be turned over to the initial IPR holder; conditions preventing challenges to patent validity; and 
coercive package licensing, where licensees must purchase the rights to use several patents at once.28
While Article 40 may be helpful in controlling certain anti-competitive practices, its practical 
importance is limited for technology transfer. Most importantly, it only addresses licensing practices and 
thus “fails to control a major part of technology transfer transactions” (joint ventures, subcontracting, patent 
27  “[R]efusal to deal to a competitor on commercial terms, thus adversely affecting the international transfer of 
technology, is an abuse under Article 8.2 which Members may address in their legislation” (Hutchison, 2006).
28  Other potentially anti-competitive licensing practices include exclusive dealing, tying, and resale price maintenance.12  DESA Working Paper No. 71
assignment to another party, etc.) (Ullrich, 2001). Article 40 focuses squarely on practices that hurt competi-
tion, not on those that harm the environment or hamper economic development.29 Any overlap is incidental.
The three example conditions listed in Article 40 may constitute an exhaustive list in a practical 
sense.30 The potential for anti-competitive practices is difficult to determine ex ante, meaning that Member 
complaints would have to be brought post facto in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. It is hard to 
imagine many developing countries willing to invest significant resources in this process when the charges 
are not easy to define, and the lack of WTO disputes over Article 40 supports this contention.
The final competition-related provision in TRIPS occurs in the context of Article 31 unauthorized 
use exceptions, discussed in Section B. Compulsory licensing may proceed without efforts at negotiation and 
without regard to the location of the predominant market when licensing is “permitted to remedy a practice 
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive” (WTO, 1994d). The requirements 
for making the determination of anti-competitiveness are unclear. Both the text and subsequent practice are 
ambiguous about whether such a license is temporary or indefinite, but a reasonable reading is that compul-
sory licensing could persist at least until the anti-competitive practice has ceased.
In general, anti-competitive provisions in the TRIPS Agreement are vague and limited. Both Article 
8 and Article 40 require that any remedies must be consistent with the remainder of the TRIPS Agreement. 
“Consistency” could be read so broadly as to render these Articles practically useless (Ullrich, 2001). Leav-
ing these issues up to domestic law would appear to grant developing countries more freedom to regulate, 
but political realities make it difficult for most developing countries to unilaterally interpret the consistency 
requirement narrowly. Seeking a source for technology transfer, most developing countries cannot afford to 
be selective and may find themselves forced to accept anti-competitive terms.
Flexibilities for Developing Countries
Developing country Members are allowed additional time to comply with the TRIPS Agreement after join-
ing the WTO. They are given five years before the provisions come into effect (as opposed to one year for 
other Members) and an additional five years with respect to technologies that were not patentable under 
domestic laws prior to the date that TRIPS applied to that Member. Least-developed countries are given 
ten years to comply with all provisions of the Agreement other than national treatment and most-favoured 
nation principles.31 These transition periods have been further eased in the context of public health, with a 
series of waivers culminating in a developing country extension of compliance with respect to essential medi-
cines until 2016.32
29  In TRIPS negotiations, the “competition test” favored by industrialized countries during the negotiations of the Draft 
Code of Conduct, discussed in Part II, won out over the “development test” preferred by developing countries.
30  The list may actually make it easier for challenged IPR holders to deny wrongdoing, as they can point out that none 
of the three stated conditions was violated. It may also stunt negotiations of stronger competition laws. “[T]he very 
existence of Article 8(2) and Article 40 may serve as an excuse for firms not to re-enter into new discussions” (Ullrich, 
2001).
31  The national treatment principle requires that foreign firms receive the same treatment as domestic firms, and the 
most-favored nation principle requires that firms from one country receive the same treatment as firms from another 
country, ceteris paribus.
32  A proposed permanent waiver on this front has been adopted by the WTO General Council but not ratified by many 
countries (WTO, 2005a). This may be due to the fact that 2016 is sufficiently far in the future to make the political 
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Developed country Members are required to provide “technical and financial cooperation” for 
TRIPS implementation to all developing countries and “incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories” to promote technology transfer to least-developed countries (WTO, 1994d). Cooperative mea-
sures include, inter alia, “assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and en-
forcement of [IPRs] as well as on the prevention of their abuse” (WTO, 1994d). The level of cooperation 
required is not defined, nor are rubrics provided for evaluating compliance with this provision by developed 
countries.
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health reiterated developed countries’ obligation to 
provide incentives to domestic businesses and institutions to promote technology transfer to LDCs (WTO, 
2001a). The Doha Implementation Declaration mandated annual reports to the WTO from developed 
countries summarizing their efforts in this area (WTO, 2001b). While these reports have been submitted 
since 2002,33 the initiatives described “tend to be small, focused on specific projects, and not specific to the 
needs of the [LDCs]” (Barton and Maskus, 2006). There is considerable room for expansion of these reports 
and their importance, as will be discussed in Part IV.
Evaluation of the TRIPS Agreement as a Motivator of Technology Transfer
Strengths
TRIPS provides a comprehensive, enforceable private IPR regime that reduces uncertainty about IPR pro-
tection and may encourage innovation of new ESTs and their transfer to some developing countries. The 
Agreement also promotes domestic innovation in developing countries and provides some protection for 
traditional knowledge, both of which can improve environmental outcomes in the absence of technology 
transfer. The national treatment and most-favoured nation principles of TRIPS encourage free trade, which 
can promote technology transfer. The Agreement also includes a number of flexibilities, described above and 
elaborated in Part IV, which favour developing countries.
Weaknesses
On the whole, TRIPS is more concerned with how developing countries can provide an appropriate envi-
ronment for technology transfer than how developed countries can actively propel technology transfer. In 
other words, TRIPS favours “pull” factors over “push” factors (Hutchison, 2006). The demands on developed 
countries are vaguely worded, subject to numerous loopholes, and largely unenforceable.
TRIPS, unlike most WTO Agreements, is legislatively proscriptive, meaning that countries must 
enact affirmative policies to implement the Agreement (rather than simply repealing tariffs or other trade 
barriers). Given that developed countries have expertise on IPR legislation, and developing countries may 
want guidance, there is a strong possibility of foreign pressure on developing countries to strengthen IPR 
laws beyond the TRIPS requirements. So-called “TRIPS-plus” requirements are discussed more extensively 
in Part V.
For reasons outlined in Section B, firms in the poorest countries may not be able to take advantage 
of compulsory licensing exceptions. Even if granted licenses, domestic companies may not be able to afford 
to compensate IPR holders. Temporal and geographic limitations on licenses can prevent firms from recoup-
ing their investment. And competition from a more sophisticated foreign competitor with economies of scale 
33  These reports are available at http://docsonline.wto.org (search for “Report on the Implementation of Article 66.2 of 
the TRIPS Agreement”).14  DESA Working Paper No. 71
may drive licensees out of business. While proposed amendments to TRIPS would lessen these problems for 
essential medicines, EST seekers may not be able to take advantage of the amendments in their current form.
Finally, developing countries face several challenges when contesting violations of the pro-technolo-
gy transfer obligations of TRIPS. In addition to political difficulties, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism (DSM) requires large financial and human capital expenditures. While the DSM may be more favour-
able to developing countries than bilateral dispute resolution bodies, it does not go far enough in levelling 
the playing field.
Options for Dealing With TRIPS Deficiencies
There are three ways in which insufficient technology transfer under the TRIPS Agreement can be addressed. 
First, the existing flexibilities within TRIPS can be exploited. Second, developing countries can push for for-
mal modification of TRIPS. Third, other instruments can be brought to bear on the problem. These outside 
regimes could work in conjunction with TRIPS, in opposition to the Agreement, or in a completely separate 
arena. It is not clear which of these strategies is most promising, meaning that each should be encouraged in 
its own right and pursued by a combination of governmental, NGO and private actors. This Part concludes 
by providing a rationale for customizing domestic IPR laws to specific developing country circumstances.
Exploiting Existing Flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement
Part III pointed out a number of ways in which TRIPS could allow both developing and developed countries 
to encourage technology transfer. Working within TRIPS is likely to be easier than modifying or abandoning 
the Agreement, so it would behove developing countries to test its limits.
First, developing countries should demand accountability from developed countries regarding their 
incentive and reporting obligations vis-à-vis technology transfer. These obligations must be met in spite of 
the recent deadlock in Doha Round negotiations. A united group of developing country Members could put 
significant pressure on the WTO to monitor the fulfilment of these obligations. Nongovernmental organiza-
tions with access to reports could pursue a policy of “naming and shaming.” While results are not assured, 
heightened awareness of unmet obligations by developed nations should at least place developing countries 
in a stronger negotiating position.
Second, developing countries should stress the stated goals of TRIPS regarding technology transfer. 
Given these guiding principles, actions to exempt certain technologies from patentability and restrict anti-
competitive measures ought to be viewed as “TRIPS-consistent.” The provisions discussed in Part III should 
be read as a unified document, not in isolation (WTO, 2007). The manner in which provisions are inter-
preted should be consistent with the principles, and not only the other way around.
Third, EST transfer should be connected in the minds of Members with recent allowances made for 
pharmaceutical products. The Doha Declarations were a watershed in WTO negotiations concerning the 
importance of outside factors in interpreting TRIPS. While EST transfer may not currently address a public 
health “emergency,” the anticipated consequences of climate change could plausibly create an “urgent” situa-
tion that would justify compulsory licensing exceptions under Article 31.34 The issues are undoubtedly more 
34  An impending lawsuit to be filed by the State of California and others against the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency regarding regulation of greenhouse gases will make the argument that public health concerns justify immediate 
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complex in the EST context than for essential medicines, given the murky definition of terms discussed in 
Part II and the less visible nature of the problem. However, developing countries might well choose to advo-
cate broadening the conception of current licensing exceptions beyond essential medicines.
Potential Modifications of the TRIPS Agreement
“[T]o benefit from [TRIPS] flexibilities requires a degree of legal and regulatory expertise that may exceed 
the capacity of many countries for the foreseeable future” (Reichman and Maskus, 2004). If efforts to work 
within the existing Agreement fail, there are a number of tacks that WTO negotiators could take to make 
TRIPS more EST transfer-friendly.
Climate-change-related technology exceptions could be sought along the lines of essential medi-
cines exceptions, discussed previously. Perhaps a new “Declaration on TRIPS and Climate Change” could 
clarify existing flexibilities and offer new incentives for EST transfer. In particular, exceptions for small island 
LDCs could be pursued, given that trade and investment flows are not as responsive to IPR protections in 
these countries and the dangers posed by climate change are particularly acute. As suggested earlier, such a 
modification would have to take into account the uncertain and ever-changing nature of the climate change 
problem and address adaptation as well as mitigation technologies.
Strong, integrated pro-competition provisions would also promote technology transfer. The class of 
restrictive business conditions in Article 40 could be expanded, and compulsory licensing under Article 31 
could be facilitated for ESTs. “[M]any developing countries take the view that compulsory licensing should 
be required if the public interest is injured due to an abuse of patent monopoly” (Matsushita, 2006). With 
their growing clout in the WTO, these Members could redefine “abuse” in this context to extend beyond 
licensing restrictions and into other IPR-related practices which present barriers to EST transfer (Hutchison, 
forthcoming).35 Developed countries could also take the lead here by mandating compulsory licensing for 
climate-change-related IPRs held domestically, a strategy that has yet to be tried.36 Pro-competition provi-
sions would, however, meet with strong resistance from IPR holders who exert great influence with several 
WTO Members.
Procedures for challenging patents could be made less cumbersome in order to lower costs for devel-
oping countries (Stiglitz, 2008). Creation of a straightforward pre-patent opposition process could further 
reduce costs and prevent abuses. On a related note, patentability criteria should be strengthened to minimize 
fraudulent and frivolous patents.
Licensing guidelines might be promulgated which provide for fixed, moderate fees for EST patent li-
censees. In cases where the protected asset clearly has environmental benefits, the IPR holder would bear the 
burden of proof in demonstrating why compulsory licensing would be unwarranted (Scherer, 1984; Stiglitz, 
2008). A tiered application fee system for IPRs could waive payments for patent holders who authorize ESTs 
for transfer to developing countries (Barton and Maskus, 2006; Maskus, 2004). These proposals would con-
stitute a major shift in the WTO’s approach to IPRs, however, and would require protracted negotiations.
35  On the other hand, too much fear of increased competition might hinder technology transfer on balance.
36  For example, the United States could mandate that EST patent holders license their technologies abroad under 
specified terms. Admittedly, this proposal would be quite difficult politically.16  DESA Working Paper No. 71
If full licenses are unrealistic, temporary licenses could be granted along the lines of plant breeders’ 
exemptions and farmers’ privileges under the International Seed Treaty.37 For example, IPR holders could 
provide developing country users with technologies for a limited period, with the expectation of receiving 
payment once the technology was “tropicalized,” i.e., adapted to local requirements. This proposal would 
work with climate-change adaptation technologies as well as mitigation technologies.
As mentioned earlier, evaluation mechanisms for progress on technology transfer could stand to be 
strengthened. Such a mechanism might be TRIPS-based or involve multiple WTO Agreements (Maskus, 
2004). The problem with current evaluation is twofold: non-transparency and lack of a viable enforcement 
mechanism. In the absence of formal enforcement, naming and shaming would at least provide some mea-
sure of accountability.
There are, of course, great political difficulties involved in modifying any WTO Agreement. Tech-
nology transfer often disadvantages IPR holders, who have great political influence in developed countries. 
And despite the recognition of development goals, equal treatment of nations is at the heart of TRIPS. 
However, equal treatment of technologies may not be as crucial, as evidenced by the progress on essential 
medicines. Global environmental progress is certainly not a zero-sum game, and the best hope for any WTO 
Member interested in TRIPS modification in this area will be to stress common interests in advancing envi-
ronmental aims.38
Regimes Outside of TRIPS Related to Intellectual Property Rights
There are a number of options for promoting technology transfer through IPRs outside of the TRIPS 
context. These include an open-source approach to technological information, a formal global competition 
agreement, fiscal subsidies or international funding mechanisms, and an organization devoted to matching 
technology needs to existing and prospective innovations.
Open-source Information Access
Access to information is a key barrier to technology transfer, even when licensing or other options are avail-
able. The seriousness of this problem is growing, as increasing intellectual property privatization is stunting 
even basic research.39 Joint university ventures, which are often conducted largely with public funding, pres-
ent fundamental problems of fairness when the fruits of research are protected. Compounding the problem, 
patentability criteria are becoming increasingly lax in industrialized countries, opening the door for over-
patenting.40
One solution to this problem would be an information access agreement. As far back as 1992, there 
have been calls for an information clearinghouse of ESTs (United Nations, 1992b). However, these efforts 
37  Breeders’ exemptions allow breeders of plant varieties to use protected plant varieties for experimental purposes to 
create new varieties. Farmers’ privileges permit farmers to save and re-use protected seed varieties for subsequent 
harvests.
38  One avenue for compromise might be to stress and strengthen other incentives for innovation in lieu of IPR rights. 
These include reputation advantage and innovation lag (the first mover has a head start).
39  “[G]overnments are increasingly imposing restraints on the use of knowledge generated by public research or through 
public funding…. This protection is expanding beyond products and applied technologies to basic ideas, procedures, 
and materials…. Increasing privatization of basic data by entities in the developed countries threatens to retard the 
diffusion of such knowledge into science and competition in developing countries” (Barton and Maskus, 2006). This 
basic scientific research is the bedrock for most innovation at the technology frontier (David, 2004).
40  For example, the United States’ “utility standard” for patents has been weakened in recent years, as has the EU’s 
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tend to be too supply-oriented and lack needs-based assessments to match appropriate technologies to differ-
ent circumstances.
The International Seed Treaty’s Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing, discussed in Part 
II, could be a model for an agreement on access to ESTs (Halewood and Nnadozie, 2008). Along these lines, 
John Barton and Keith Maskus have proposed a formal Agreement on Access to Basic Science and Technol-
ogy (ABST) “to ensure widespread access to essential scientific results and to enhance the transfer of basic 
technological information to the developing world at reasonable cost” (Barton and Maskus, 2006). As a 
WTO Agreement, the ABST could take advantage of the DSM and other institutional structures.
Such an agreement would encounter some difficulties. Drawing a satisfactory line between “basic” 
and “applied” research would be a challenge. In order to favour ESTs, the definition of “basic” could be 
construed more broadly in the context of global public goods (Barton and Maskus, 2006). In borderline 
cases, there would need to be guidelines about which research results were confidential and which were made 
public.
Another option for promoting information access related to EST patents is a private voluntary 
system. Such an effort is currently underway, led by the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment and IBM Corporation. The Eco-Patent Commons, a database of freely available EST patents, operates 
on the principle of “share one, take one.” While the initiative has promise, there has been little activity after 
six months.41 Without a more coercive approach, it is difficult to see a useful system of information access 
emerging from a voluntary effort. Naming and shaming has limitations, particularly when no one is paying 
much attention.
World Competition Agreement
As discussed in Part III, the lack of a unified pro-competition agreement may be hindering EST transfer to 
developing countries. A competitive marketplace can be thought of as a type of public good. This good can-
not be provided adequately through a piecemeal process, particularly when the source of pro-competition 
rules is an agreement designed to protect intellectual property rights (Ullrich, 2001; Guasch and Rajapati-
rana, 1994). IPRs are fundamentally opposed to free competition; they can only be justified in light of the 
dynamic incentives for innovation which they create. And, as discussed above, the current TRIPS provisions 
focus on “post-grant intervention” (after patents are awarded) and fail to address the competition problem at 
its formative stages by preventing opportunistic behaviour of IPR-holding firms (Biadgleng, 2006).
The details of a comprehensive competition agreement are beyond the scope of this paper, but pos-
sible provisions include outlawing “consensus wrongs” like price-fixing, bid-rigging, and boycotts (Ullrich, 
2001); agreement by developed countries to prosecute competition cases against domestic firms engaging 
in abusive practices abroad (Maskus, 2004); and pre-emption clauses which supersede regional and bilateral 
trade and investment agreements (Biadgleng, 2006).42
A potential world competition agreement would face a number of challenges. First, domestic 
competition laws of different countries are currently very dissimilar. Many industrialized countries have 
41  Only 31 patents were available as of August 8, 2008, 27 of which were issued by IBM. A complete list is available at 
http://www.wbcsd.org/. 
42  A preemption clause would make other trade and competition agreements subservient to the provisions of the world 
competition agreement. 18  DESA Working Paper No. 71
extremely complex competition law regimes that would be difficult to mesh. Prior to serious negotiations, 
some informal headway must be made toward harmonization of these laws, at least on the theoretical level. 
Second, it would be politically difficult to engage in extraterritorial enforcement of anti-competition laws 
which harmed domestic firms. Finally, a balance would need to be struck between promoting competition 
and providing a degree of IPR protection adequate to recoup investments (Ullrich, 2001).
Just as TRIPS may be a poor forum for reforming competition laws, a global competition agreement 
might not be appropriate to address many IPR issues. The Doha Ministerial Declaration has already suggest-
ed that negotiations begin on a world competition pact, but little progress has been made (WTO, 2001c).
Funding Mechanisms
Governments can subsidize technology development and transfer, either individually or in concert. Individu-
al countries’ subsidies, tax breaks and other fiscal incentives are the most straightforward method of funding. 
They can focus private firms on particular sectors like climate-change-related technologies by reducing the 
risk level of R&D projects (Stiglitz, 2008). However, individual governments are limited in their financial 
impact, and such expenditures are subject to a free rider problem on the global level (Barton and Maskus, 
2006).
A coordinated international funding mechanism would help solve the free rider problem. Possibili-
ties for such a fund include a trust fund encouraging R&D directly in developing countries (Roffe, 2002), a 
patent acquisition fund to buy IPRs from patent holders (United Nations, 2008), and a fund which covered 
the difference in cost between the EST and the business-as-usual technology for developing country firms.43
Another possibility is an advance purchase commitment, also known as a guaranteed purchase fund. 
Under this scheme, an organization, government, or consortium promises to buy a certain amount of a 
product from the innovator. Such a system has been used to stimulate R&D for orphan drugs and for other 
public health initiatives.44 A guaranteed purchase fund would improve incentives to innovate, but it would 
not address the other problems with IPRs.
A prize system, on the other hand, would eliminate many of these problems. A contest is pre-an-
nounced and a one-time prize is awarded to the successful innovator in exchange for the IPR. Prizes help to 
reduce wasteful spending on marketing and lower incentives for anti-competitive behaviours (Stiglitz, 2008). 
On the other hand, prizes, like guaranteed purchase funds, work best with a specific objective. Once again, 
essential medicines are much more amenable to this requirement (“find a cure for breast cancer”) than are 
climate-change-related technologies (“find a viable alternative to fossil fuel consumption”).
Technology-Matching Organization
A new public institution could be created, or an existing one given the responsibility, for actively matching 
specific EST needs of developing countries to innovators in developed countries. This organization could 
also be responsible for monitoring patent protection on ESTs, alerting key players in developing countries 
when patents are about to expire, and brokering licensing agreements. This matching, which could be done 
at the target project level rather than the early-stage R&D level, has the potential to create value for the in-
43  This system is used by the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol. 
44  Examples include the Orphan Drug Act in the United States, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
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novator, through diminished demand uncertainty, and for the buyer, through lowered prices.45 However, a 
pilot project run by UNDP along these lines failed in the late 1990s (Verhoosel, 1998).
Customizing Domestic Intellectual Property Laws
For developing countries, tailoring IPR protections to national circumstances is a difficult balancing act. As 
discussed in Part II, the effects of IPR laws on technology transfer vary with country characteristics. Thus, 
the “one size fits all” model of TRIPS is insufficient to deal with the diverse economic needs of developing 
countries and the vastly different levels of EST technology present in different countries (Hoekman, 2004; 
Chang, 2001). Flexibility is needed to allow countries to set their own IPR practices, within reasonable 
boundaries, to meet their economic, social and environmental needs.
The principle of common but differentiated country responsibilities is well-established in inter-
national law (United Nations, 1992a). When judging IPR regimes, it is important to take account of the 
historical context of IPRs in development. Modern industrialized countries routinely violated IPRs of 
foreign citizens and firms well into the twentieth century (Chang, 2001). In this context, asking developing 
countries to adhere to a stricter standard at this point in time seems unreasonable. Add to this the fact that 
developed countries are responsible for the majority of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and the case 
for differential treatment for ESTs looks even stronger. Developing countries should be permitted to consider 
this historical backdrop when tailoring domestic IPR laws.
Concurrent Policies Promoting Climate-Change-Related Technology Transfer
Given the broad definition of technology transfer stated in Part II, it comes as no surprise that IPR laws 
are only one of a host of legal, institutional and other factors that affect transfer of climate-change-related 
technologies. Concurrent trade and economic policies will be needed to complement TRIPS and other intel-
lectual property agreements in order to promote EST transfer. At the national, regional and global levels, 
effective technology transfer must come from a holistic approach.46 Rather than a uniform policy strategy, a 
heterogeneous solution that integrates technology transfer concerns at all levels of public policy is required 
(WTO, 2002).
Trade Policies
The United States and the European Union, among others, are steadily strengthening IPRs and eroding the 
TRIPS flexibilities by including more stringent “TRIPS-plus” provisions in regional and bilateral free trade 
agreements (World Bank, 2005). Examples include:
extended patent protection periods; • 
broadened patentability coverage (e.g., life forms); • 
“evergreening,” or patent re-registration for different uses of a single innovation; • 
“regulatory linkage,” which effectively prevents licensees from entering the market; •  47
45  India has proposed a project-based approach similar to that described here (WTO, 2005b).
46  The IPCC has termed this the “National System of Innovation” approach (IPCC, 2000).
47  An example of regulatory linkage would be a requirement that safety product manufacturers submit extensive test 
data before they can sell products, even if such data has already been submitted by the IPR holder. Without gaining 
access to the protected data through further negotiations with the IPR holder, the licensee will not be able to enter the 
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enhanced data exclusivity provisions (e.g., clinical trial data); • 
treatment of IPRs as investments, which opens them up to extensive investor protections; • 
greater deference allowed to individual private contracts in addressing access and benefit sharing;  • 
and
creation of dispute settlement mechanisms less receptive to developing countries than that of the  • 
WTO.
The bulk of the responsibility here lies with developed country trade negotiators and the political 
leaders they serve. Developed countries could adopt a “Domestic Doha Agenda” agreeing not to undermine 
developing country rights under TRIPS, but this seems politically unrealistic (Fink, 2008). In any case, 
developing countries are advised to resist these provisions and try to maintain TRIPS as a ceiling on IPR 
protections (Barton, 2007).
Conversely, regional and bilateral trade agreements offer an opportunity to encourage provisions 
that go beyond TRIPS in encouraging technology transfer. These “TRIPS-minus” provisions might include 
reduction of tariff barriers for ESTs, prohibition of certain anti-competitive contractual provisions, and sev-
eral other potential TRIPS modifications suggested in Part IV. Developing countries should also be allowed 
and empowered to play a greater role in other trade-related negotiations (e.g., those involving technical 
standards) (Maskus, 2004).
Other Policies
Technology absorption is at least as important as technology transfer. Once technologies are transferred, 
they must be adopted and used effectively. The most important element of technology absorption is human 
capital (Hoekman, 2004).48 Particularly with cutting-edge technologies, well-educated engineers and manag-
ers are essential.49 In addition to making improvements in domestic education, developing countries should 
offer incentives to students to guard against a “brain drain.” Developed countries, for their part, should 
subsidize offshore training, conference attendance and, in some cases, temporary employment for graduates 
from developing countries. Grant proposals for EST research involving developing country teams should also 
receive special consideration (Maskus, 2004).
Working within the boundaries of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (WTO, 
1994e) and other WTO Agreements, developed country governments can provide incentives for R&D and 
technology diffusion in the climate change context. For example, equal or better tax treatment could be 
awarded to R&D performed in developing countries (Maskus, 2004).50 Tax credits could also be awarded to 
companies that transfer ESTs or make them publicly available. Developing country governments can reduce 
48  Technologies can be separated into two general categories: hard technologies, which are not necessarily physical objects 
but can be codified in some way using detailed instructions; and soft technologies, which consist of “know-how” or 
training. Both are ultimately necessary to successful technology deployment, but either one could be the binding 
constraint in a given circumstance. 
This is an empirical question whose answer cannot be generalized, but it is worthwhile to point out that proponents of 
strong IPRs typically argue that soft technologies are the binding constraint. The implication, of course, is that stricter 
IPR protections for hard technologies are not slowing technology transfer. It would also suggest, though, that transfer 
agreements ought to include provisions for training and management exchange to increase absorption.
49  One advantage of traditional knowledge and technology, on the other hand, is that sufficient human capital is probably 
already in place in developing countries.
50  However, this proposal may run into problems with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
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entry barriers in supplier industries to make FDI and R&D more attractive to multinational corporations 
(Maskus, 2004). They can also pass stricter environmental legislation in order to increase the market for 
ESTs. Infrastructure improvements can improve domestic capacity for EST utilization. Finally, unprotected 
pre-commercial ESTs could be incubated with government funds in exchange for public access for domestic 
firms (Ockwell, 2007).
Conclusion
The need for IPR protection as a stimulant for innovation needs to be properly balanced with the growing 
need for climate-change-related technology transfer to developing countries. Despite the development-
friendly language in the TRIPS Agreement, economic and sustainable development goals of developing 
countries are currently subsidiary to IPR privileges. The TRIPS Agreement should not focus solely on pro-
tecting IPRs; its goal is to create an IPR regime that provides incentives for technological innovation and its 
global diffusion and usage. The climate change problem may soon approach the status of a global emergency, 
in the vein of current epidemics, and IPR protections cannot be allowed unduly to hinder EST transfer.
At the heart of this issue is a fundamental question: to what extent is knowledge a public good? The 
recent trend has been to privatize many forms of knowledge, which has created an “anti-commons” that 
stifles both innovation and technology diffusion (Barton and Maskus, 2006; Heller, 2008; Boyle, 2003). 
Intellectual property rights are not primarily a means to ensure competition, as many IPR holders argue. 
Rather, IPRs are a barrier to free competition that must be tolerated only to the extent necessary to encour-
age technological progress (Ullrich, 2001).51 To emphasize this view and reverse the privatization of knowl-
edge, open-source models must be used and public innovation encouraged through financial and policy 
incentives. Technologies that supply a “global public good,” as climate-change -related technologies do, merit 
special treatment under TRIPS and other trade agreements. In this regard, further examination of the simi-
larities and differences between the cases of essential medicines and ESTs is warranted.
This debate must also be viewed as an ethical one. Intellectual property rights are held overwhelm-
ingly by firms in countries which are the most responsible for the climate change problem, yet those who 
will suffer most from climate change are located in developing countries that lack access to ESTs. In addition 
to the economic and environmental reasons for encouraging EST transfer, there is a moral imperative to do 
so (Haugen, 2007; Chapman, 2002).
Many avenues for moving toward an IPR regime favouring EST transfer have been discussed in this 
paper. None of them alone will be up to the task. Developing countries must use TRIPS to their full advan-
tage, amendments of TRIPS must be pursued, and other methods of encouraging technology transfer must 
be generated.
Intellectual property rights are not the only barrier to technology transfer, and they may not be the 
binding constraint in many cases. To make this determination, further empirical analysis of the role they play 
in EST transfer is needed (Musungu, 2005). Setting strict rules for IPRs without knowing more about how 
they affect technology transfer would be counterproductive (Reichman and Maskus, 2004).
At the present moment, there are reasons to be concerned about IPR effects on technology transfer. 
For instance, TRIPS-plus agreements continue to proliferate, undermining some of the flexibilities in the 
51  The TRIPS Agreement’s Preamble and Article 7 language strongly support this view.22  DESA Working Paper No. 71
initial Agreement. Still, there are also reasons for optimism. The developing world’s increasing economic 
and political influence is sure to change negotiation dynamics in the WTO. A “second enclosure move-
ment” threatens to overrun key scientific research and technologies (Boyle, 2003),52 but the profound threat 
posed by climate change is increasingly being recognized and addressed by the policy makers. The TRIPS 
Agreement, in its current form, does not provide an appropriate environment for large-scale climate-change-
related technology transfer to developing countries. However, whether through reinterpretation, modifica-
tion, or circumvention of the Agreement, a number of promising avenues exist for strengthening the global 
framework for transfer of climate-change-related technologies to developing countries.
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ANNEX B




Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual 
property, including developmental and technological objectives;
Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum 
flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound 




For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 
nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.
ARTICLE 7
Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations.
ARTICLE 8
Principles
1.  Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement.
2.  Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may 
be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology.




1.  Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 
and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination 
as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.
2.  Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect hu-
man, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such 
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
3.  Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a)  diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals;
(b)  plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the produc-
tion of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall 
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement.
ARTICLE 28
Rights Conferred
1.  A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a)  where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s 
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importinga for these purposes that prod-
uct;
(b)  where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s 
consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing 
for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.
2.  Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to con-
clude licensing contracts.
…
a  This right, like all other rights conferred under this Agreement in respect of the use, sale, importation or other 
distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions of Article 6.36  DESA Working Paper No. 71
ARTICLE 30
Exceptions to Rights Conferred
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties.
ARTICLE 31
Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder
Where the law of a Member allows for other useb of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization 
of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government, the fol-
lowing provisions shall be respected:
(a)  authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b)  such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain 
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts 
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a Member 
in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right 
holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial 
use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable 
grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be 
informed promptly;
(c)  the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, and 
in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a prac-
tice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive;
(d)  such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e)  such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys 
such use;
(f)  any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Mem-
ber authorizing such use;
(g)  authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate interests of 
the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and 
are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated request, 
the continued existence of these circumstances;
(h)  the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization;
b  “Other use” refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30.The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to DCs  37
(i)  the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use shall be subject to judicial 
review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;
(j)  any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to judicial 
review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;
(k)  Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such 
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competi-
tive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of 
remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authori-
zation if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur;
(l)  where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent (“the second patent”) which can-
not be exploited without infringing another patent (“the first patent”), the following additional conditions 
shall apply:
(i)  the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important technical advance of consider-
able economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent;
(ii)  the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the inven-
tion claimed in the second patent; and
(iii)  the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of 
the second patent.
ARTICLE 31bis (not yet in force)c
1.   The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) shall not apply with respect to the 
grant by it of a compulsory licence to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceuti-
cal product(s) and its export to an eligible importing Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out in 
paragraph 2 of the Annex to this Agreement.
2.   Where a compulsory licence is granted by an exporting Member under the system set out in this 
Article and the Annex to this Agreement, adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) shall be paid in 
that Member taking into account the economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been 
authorized in the exporting Member. Where a compulsory licence is granted for the same products in the 
eligible importing Member, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(h) shall not apply in respect of 
those products for which remuneration in accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph is paid in the 
exporting Member.
3.   With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing power for, 
and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products: where a developing or least developed 
country WTO Member is a party to a regional trade agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1994 and the Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reci-
c  Article 31bis shall take effect for the Members that have accepted it upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Members 
and thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it. As of 11 July, 2008, 43 of 151 Members had ratified the 
amendment.38  DESA Working Paper No. 71
procity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), at least half of the current membership 
of which is made up of countries presently on the United Nations list of least developed countries, the obli-
gation of that Member under Article 31(f) shall not apply to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical 
product produced or imported under a compulsory licence in that Member to be exported to the markets 
of those other developing or least developed country parties to the regional trade agreement that share the 
health problem in question. It is understood that this will not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent 
rights in question.
4.   Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of this Article 
and the Annex to this Agreement under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994.
5.   This Article and the Annex to this Agreement are without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flex-
ibilities that Members have under the provisions of this Agreement other than paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 
31, including those reaffirmed by the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/2), and to their interpretation. They are also without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical 




The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from 
the filing date.d
…
SEctioN 7: protEctioN of UNDiScloSED iNformAtioN
ARTICLE 39
1.   In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis 
of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with para-
graph 2 and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3.
2.   Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their 
control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary 
to honest commercial practicese so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its compo-
nents, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the 
kind of information in question;
d  It is understood that those Members which do not have a system of original grant may provide that the term of 
protection shall be computed from the filing date in the system of original grant.
e  For the purpose of this provision, “a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” shall mean at least practices 
such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed 
information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved 
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(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the 
information, to keep it secret.
3.   Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agri-
cultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other 
data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commer-
cial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect 
the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.
SEctioN 8: coNtrol of ANti-compEtitivE  
prActicES iN coNtrActUAl licENcES
ARTICLE 40
1.  Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights 
which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination 
of technology.
2.  Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing 
practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having 
an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. As provided above, a Member may adopt, consis-
tently with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, 
which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity 
and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member.
3.  Each Member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any other Member which has cause 
to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is a national or domiciliary of the Member to which 
the request for consultations has been addressed is undertaking practices in violation of the requesting Mem-
ber’s laws and regulations on the subject matter of this Section, and which wishes to secure compliance with 
such legislation, without prejudice to any action under the law and to the full freedom of an ultimate deci-
sion of either Member. The Member addressed shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to, and shall 
afford adequate opportunity for, consultations with the requesting Member, and shall cooperate through 
supply of publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to the matter in question and of other 
information available to the Member, subject to domestic law and to the conclusion of mutually satisfactory 
agreements concerning the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting Member.
4.  A Member whose nationals or domiciliaries are subject to proceedings in another Member concern-
ing alleged violation of that other Member’s laws and regulations on the subject matter of this Section shall, 
upon request, be granted an opportunity for consultations by the other Member under the same conditions 
as those foreseen in paragraph 3.
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ARTICLE 65
Transitional Arrangements
1.  Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, no Member shall be obliged to apply the provi-
sions of this Agreement before the expiry of a general period of one year following the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement.
2.  A developing country Member is entitled to delay for a further period of four years the date of appli-
cation, as defined in paragraph 1, of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles 3, 4 and 5.
3.  Any other Member which is in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a mar-
ket, free-enterprise economy and which is undertaking structural reform of its intellectual property system 
and facing special problems in the preparation and implementation of intellectual property laws and regula-
tions, may also benefit from a period of delay as foreseen in paragraph 2.
4.  To the extent that a developing country Member is obliged by this Agreement to extend product 
patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable in its territory on the general date of application 
of this Agreement for that Member, as defined in paragraph 2, it may delay the application of the provisions 
on product patents of Section 5 of Part II to such areas of technology for an additional period of five years.
5.  A Member availing itself of a transitional period under paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 shall ensure that any 
changes in its laws, regulations and practice made during that period do not result in a lesser degree of con-
sistency with the provisions of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 66
Least-Developed Country Members
1.  In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members, their economic, 
financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base, 
such Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 
and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 65. The 
Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country Member, accord exten-
sions of this period.
2.  Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territo-
ries for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members 
in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.
ARTICLE 67
Technical Cooperation
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed country Members shall provide, on 
request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of de-
veloping and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation 
of laws and regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to DCs  41
prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domes-




Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a)  to require a Member to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its 
essential security interests; or
(b)  to prevent a Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests;
(i)  relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii)  relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods 
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii)  taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c)  to prevent a Member from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.
…
ANNEX TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (not yet in force)f
1.   For the purposes of Article 31bis and this Annex:
(a)   “pharmaceutical product” means any patented product, or product manufactured through a pat-
ented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health problems as recognized in 
paragraph 1 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2). It is 
understood that active ingredients necessary for its manufacture and diagnostic kits needed for its use would 
be included;g
(b)   “eligible importing Member” means any least-developed country Member, and any other Member 
that has made a notificationh to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the system set out in Article 
31bis and this Annex (“system”) as an importer, it being understood that a Member may notify at any time 
that it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, for example only in the case of a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. It is noted that some 
f  This Annex shall take effect for the Members that have accepted it upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Members 
and thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it. As of 11 July, 2008, 43 of 151 Members had ratified the 
amendment.
g  This subparagraph is without prejudice to subparagraph 1(b).
h  It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system.42  DESA Working Paper No. 71
Members will not use the system as importing Membersi and that some other Members have stated that, if 
they use the system, it would be in no more than situations of national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency;
(c)   “exporting Member” means a Member using the system to produce pharmaceutical products for, 
and export them to, an eligible importing Member.
2.   The terms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 31bis are that:
(a)   the eligible importing Member(s)j has made a notificationk to the Council for TRIPS, that:
(i)   specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed;l
(ii)   confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a least developed country 
Member, has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
for the product(s) in question in one of the ways set out in the Appendix to this Annex; and
(iii)   confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory, it has granted or intends 
to grant a compulsory licence in accordance with Articles 31 and 31bis of this Agreement and the provisions 
of this Annex;m
(b)   the compulsory licence issued by the exporting Member under the system shall contain the follow-
ing conditions:
(i)   only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s) may be manu-
factured under the licence and the entirety of this production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has 
notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS;
(ii)   products produced under the licence shall be clearly identified as being produced under the system 
through specific labelling or marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products through special packaging 
and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and 
does not have a significant impact on price; and
(iii)   before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a websiten the following information:
—   the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in indent (i) above; and
—   the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii) above;
i  Australia, Canada, the European Communities with, for the purposes of Article 31bis and this Annex, its member 
States, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States.
j  Joint notifications providing the information required under this subparagraph may be made by the regional 
organizations referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 31bis on behalf of eligible importing Members using the system that 
are parties to them, with the agreement of those parties.
k  It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system.
l  The notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the WTO website 
dedicated to the system.
m  This subparagraph is without prejudice to Article 66.1 of this Agreement.
n  The licensee may use for this purpose its own website or, with the assistance of the WTO Secretariat, the page on the 
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(c)   the exporting Member shall notifyo the Council for TRIPS of the grant of the licence, including the 
conditions attached to it.9p The information provided shall include the name and address of the licensee, 
the product(s) for which the licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the 
country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of the licence. The notification 
shall also indicate the address of the website referred to in subparagraph (b)(iii) above.
3.   In order to ensure that the products imported under the system are used for the public health 
purposes underlying their importation, eligible importing Members shall take reasonable measures within 
their means, proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent 
re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into their territories under the system. In the 
event that an eligible importing Member that is a developing country Member or a least-developed country 
Member experiences difficulty in implementing this provision, developed country Members shall provide, 
on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in order to 
facilitate its implementation.
4.   Members shall ensure the availability of effective legal means to prevent the importation into, and 
sale in, their territories of products produced under the system and diverted to their markets inconsistently 
with its provisions, using the means already required to be available under this Agreement. If any Member 
considers that such measures are proving insufficient for this purpose, the matter may be reviewed in the 
Council for TRIPS at the request of that Member.
5.   With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing power for, 
and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products, it is recognized that the development of 
systems providing for the grant of regional patents to be applicable in the Members described in paragraph 
3 of Article 31bis should be promoted. To this end, developed country Members undertake to provide 
technical cooperation in accordance with Article 67 of this Agreement, including in conjunction with other 
relevant intergovernmental organizations.
6.   Members recognize the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and capacity building 
in the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem faced by Members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. To this end, eligible importing Members and export-
ing Members are encouraged to use the system in a way which would promote this objective. Members 
undertake to cooperate in paying special attention to the transfer of technology and capacity building in the 
pharmaceutical sector in the work to be undertaken pursuant to Article 66.2 of this Agreement, paragraph 7 
of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and any other relevant work of the Council 
for TRIPS.
7.   The Council for TRIPS shall review annually the functioning of the system with a view to ensuring 
its effective operation and shall annually report on its operation to the General Council.
o  It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system.
p  The notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the WTO website 
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Assessment of Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector
Least-developed country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector.
For other eligible importing Members insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in ques-
tion may be established in either of the following ways:
(i)  the Member in question has established that it has no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical 
sector;
or
(ii)   where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in this sector, it has examined this capacity and 
found that, excluding any capacity owned or controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for 
the purposes of meeting its needs. When it is established that such capacity has become sufficient to meet the 
Member’s needs, the system shall no longer apply.